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1 Introduction
The process of innovation is traditionally seen as one where a new (and better) product
or technology replaces an outdated standard. However, examples abound where different
generations coexist, and sometimes obsolete technologies become useful again, especially
in combination with a newer one. A very timely example is the “comeback of vinyl.”
While this technology had been almost abandoned in the late nineties, vinyl sales have
been constantly increasing since the early 2000s. Engineers even predict that, while re-
maining a niche product, vinyl record has come back to stay as the only analogue medium
(Bartmanski and Woodward, 2015).
The purpose of this paper is to offer a theoretical framework for the study of a feature
of innovation which has been largely overlooked: the process of substitution by subse-
quent innovations is not necessarily transitive. The fact that a second-generation product
or technology makes first-generation ones obsolete does not impede the success of the
third generation to have positive effects on the first one. The arrival of the third generation
can indeed create new complementarities with the first one, that make a comeback possi-
ble. Our work is at the intersection of the literature on product positioning and design and
the one on innovation and technology substitution. By understanding better incomplete
substitutions, we claim to identify conditions on product positioning and design that make
the comeback of technologies possible. We use the word “technology” in a broad sense:
our specification applies to durable goods for which different variants appear sequentially,
the next one being preferred to the previous one, all other things held equal.
We provide a simple, testable condition on consumer choice for the process of tech-
nology substitution not to be transitive. A second generation (CD) can be better than a
first generation (vinyl) in most dimensions, while the remaining disadvantages are tolera-
ble, so that no consumer bothers owning both of them. The same may hold between the
third generation (digital music) and the second one. However, it is still possible that there
is one dimension on which the advantages of the first generation compared with the third
one are sufficiently important for the former to complement the latter. For instance, the
physical features of the vinyl make it an ideal complement to digital music for consumers
valuing this dimension. In general, a given consumer that would completely stop buying
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the first generation when the second appears may start buying the first generation again
as a complement to the third one, if its “strong” characteristics add enough value. The
above condition is at the consumer level. It is absolutely possible that it only applies to a
subset of the population, so that some consumers never stop buying vinyl while others do
not see the interest of vinyl in presence of digital music. The “three-generation” model is
a minimum working example, and there is no particular reason to limit our understand-
ing of incomplete substitution to a specific number of innovations. More generally, our
model shows in which circumstances a product that has been abandoned by a given type
of consumers can become attractive again in the presence of an innovation.
As documented at length in the marketing literature, consumer choice is a complex
decision based on several dimensions of product positioning and product design (see for
instance Green and Krieger, 1992; Kaul and Rao, 1995), which, in turn, aim at hetero-
geneous consumers (see for instance Michalek et al., 2011). In particular, if consumers
value different attributes of a product in different ways, whether because they have dif-
ferent preferences or because they happen to be in different situations, a large part of the
job of the marketer is to decide which product attributes to emphasize (Chakraborty and
Harbaugh, 2014). The marketer also needs to choose whether to design and advertise the
product as mainstream or to aim at a specific niche of the market (Johnson and Myatt,
2006). We show that if marketers are to rejuvenate an obsolete technology, they may
achieve it by emphasizing those attributes that some consumers value in the first gener-
ation as a complement to the third one. If the conditions for a comeback are relatively
difficult to meet, a marketer should choose a “niche” design in order to provide enough
added-utility for some consumers to choose an additional “coming-back” technology. If
the comeback is easier to achieve, the marketer should choose a “mainstream” design.
As discussed in Section 7, our approach is not limited to the clear-cut examples where
the coming-back technology is almost identical to what it used to be, but also to brand
rejuvenation with strategic use of some characteristics of abandoned technologies.
Extensive research in business and economics has been carried out on the diffusion
of innovation, with the aim of understanding the diffusion of new technologies over the
course of industrial history (Griliches, 1960, Geroski, 2000, Young, 2009, Peres et al.,
2010). For example, market analysts wish to predict and further influence how a new prod-
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uct gradually occupies the market or how old ones vanish from it (Mahajan and Muller,
1979, Mahajan et al., 1990, Chandrasekaran and Tellis, 2007). More recent models have
studied simultaneous launches and coexistence of technologies (see for instance Libai
et al., 2009, and Guseo and Mortarino, 2014), including applications to music industry
(Guidolin and Guseo, 2015). The role of social networks and word-of-mouth in the adop-
tion of new products has also been the subject of a lot of attention (Trusov et al., 2009,
Moldovan et al., 2011). However, none of these models studies conditions for a fading
technology to come back. Therefore, our approach provides a micro-foundation for such
models to integrate the possibility of non-transitive substitutions.
In the next section, we describe in more details the comeback of vinyl, and why it
satisfies the conditions we identify for a technological comeback with time independent
preferences. Section 3 presents a simple consumer-choice framework to understand tech-
nological comebacks. We solve for a specific example with utility function linear in prod-
uct attributes in Section 4. Section 5 provides a general condition on technological come-
backs. We study product design in Section 6. Finally, we discuss some implications of
our results to marketing and conclude in Section 7.
2 The vinyl comeback: facts and data
According to Nielsen Soundscan, more than 9.2 million vinyl records were sold in the U.S.
in 2014. This marks a 52% increase over the year before, the largest number recorded
by SoundScan since the music industry monitor started tracking them back in 1991.1
Depending on the sources, this represents around 52 or 63 percent of the total album sales
recorded on a year. A figure that some argue to be largely undervalued.4 These days,
1Megan Gibson, “Here’s Why Music Lovers Are Turning to Vinyl and Dropping Digital,” The Time,
January 13, 2015
2See Megan Gibson, “Here’s Why Music Lovers Are Turning to Vinyl and Dropping Digital,” The Time,
January 13, 2015
3See Hanna Ellis Pettersen, “Record sales: vinyl hits 25-year high,” The Guardian, January 3, 2017 and
the date from the RIAA.
4“LPs, unlike CDs, are a one-way sale: labels do not accept returns of unsold copies. Therefore labels
and retailers are careful to order only what they think they can sell. Moreover, LP jackets do not consistently
carry bar codes (...) and therefore cannot be scanned at the cash register. And many shops that sell LPs are
independents that do not report their sales.”, in Allan Kozinn, “Weaned on CDs, They’re Reaching for
Vinyl,” The New York Times, June 9, 2013
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every major label and many smaller ones are releasing vinyl. Most new major releases
have a vinyl version.5 The majority of buyers of vinyl are 35 years old or younger.6
Figure 1: Market share of different music technologies since 1980 (in terms of total revenues in the US).
Source: RIAA and authors’ computations.
We present in Figure 1 the respective shares of vinyl, CD and digital sales in the US
since 1980, according to the public data from the website of the RIAA. One can observe
a three-generation substitution pattern, very similar to a classic substitution model, with
the exception of a niche comeback. The second generation (CD) almost entirely replaces
the first one (vinyl). A third generation (digital) substitutes the second one (CD). The
comeback of the first happens only in the presence of the third. We do not distinguish be-
tween digital sales and streaming services, which could arguably be considered as differ-
ent technologies. Indeed, the latter are sometimes seen as a fourth generation technology
competing with the former (see Wlömert and Papies, 2016).
If at least some consumers with stable preferences start buying vinyl again only when
digital music is available, the condition we identify in the model of non-transitive in-
novation is fulfilled. A comeback in which the condition is not fulfilled would also be
possible if all consumers have changed preferences and become nostalgic of vinyl: if the
5Allan Kozinn, “Weaned on CDs, They’re Reaching for Vinyl,” The New York Times, June 9, 2013
6Reported in Ben Sisario, “Vinyl LP Frenzy Brings Record-Pressing Machines Back to Life,” the New
York Times, September 14, 2015.
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perceived value of vinyl increases, it is trivial that more consumers buy it. An explanation
exclusively based on nostalgia, understood as a change in consumers’ preferences, would
however contradict a number of studies in psychology, sociology and anthropology. Such
studies show that it is precisely because music has become mostly dematerialized that
more and more consumers buy new albums in what they perceive to be the most tan-
gible format: vinyl (Magaudda, 2011, Bartmanski and Woodward, 2015, Negus, 2015).
Analysts do seem to agree on one thing: the success of the vinyl is due to the fact that
“Records are admirably physical, the antithesis of the everywhere-and-nowhere airiness
of the cloud,” and that high involvement in – mostly digital – music is connected to a
perception of tangible records as more valuable (Styvén, 2010).
In this paper, we offer a framework based on time-independent preferences to explain
the trend identified above. While we do not rule out the role of nostalgia in consumer
choice (see also Section 7.1), we show that a change in consumers’ preferences is not
necessary to explain technological comebacks.
3 A model of sequential technologies
A natural explanation of a consumer’s willingness to possess simultaneously more than
one technology with similar functions is that they are imperfect substitutes to each other
in different situations in life. A consumer chooses to own one or several technologies, and
she incurs a fixed cost for each additional one. While our specification is pretty general,
an important assumption is that a technology is a durable good, so that using a given
technology in all situations is not more costly than using it in one situation only.
There are I consumers and S states of the world. The set of consumers and that of states
are denoted by I = {1, . . . , I} and S = {1, . . . ,S} respectively. States represent different
situations. State s arises with known probability piis to consumer i ∈ I, with ∑s∈Spiis = 1.
The distribution of states is heterogeneous among the consumers. In the musical context,
the state can correspond to the location (at home, in a car, on a train, in the street) or the
mood in which the consumer is when the music consumption takes place.
Let L = {1, . . . ,L} be the set of L available technologies, each of them being valued
over N attributes in the set N = {1, . . . ,N}. Vector vl = (vln)n∈N denotes the score of tech-
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nology l ∈ L over each attribute. The utility of technology l conditional on being in state s
is us(vl), with us weakly increasing in all elements of vl and strictly increasing in at least
one element of vl . Utility weakly increasing in each characteristic is the standard assump-
tion of monotonicity, according to which no one dislikes that a product turns better in one
dimension. Strict monotonicity in at least one dimension rules out the trivial case where
the consumer is indifferent between all possible products. Such a specification represents
the fact that consumers abstract several pieces of information on product characteristics
and marketing mix variables into a small number of perceptual attributes (Kaul and Rao,
1995). For expositional simplicity, we assume that piis fully determines the heterogeneity
among consumers. However, all our results hold with consumer-specific utility functions
– i.e., consumers not only differ on how frequently they are in different states, but also
how they value each dimension in each state (we use such a formulation in Section 6).
Since we solve each condition for a consumer i, consumer-specific utility functions sim-
ply correspond to adding a subscript i below each u function, so that one would have uis
instead of us.
We assume that consumers maximize their expected utility and always buy at least
one technology (the outside option is sufficiently low). To simplify the exposition, we
normalize the price of each additional technology to p, and we assume utility to be linear
in p. This implies that the market for the provision of the technologies is competitive. The
assumption of a single price p for all technologies is for expositional simplicity only. It is
easy (see Appendix) to generalize the results to different prices. We further assume a zero
marginal cost of using the technology. This corresponds to our assumption of technologies
being durable goods. However, assuming a small marginal cost would not affect our
results qualitatively. The higher the marginal cost, the more a consumer is willing to buy
more than one technology — because there is no benefit from using the same in all states
of the world. In the extreme, if technology is a non-durable good consumed only once,
the “best” product is bought in each state of the world.
Define by Λi ⊂ L the set of technologies in the bundle bought by consumer i. Then
her expected utility is
fi(Λi) = ∑
s∈S
piis max
l∈Λi
us(vl)− p|Λi|. (1)
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The first part of equation (1), ∑s∈Spiis maxl∈Λi us(vl) , is the expected value of a techno-
logical bundle Λi. Remark that in each state of the world, the “best” technology in the
bundle for that state is used. The second part of the equation is the cost of possessing
this bundle: p|Λi|, where |Λi| denotes the number of technologies in the bundle chosen by
consumer i. The cost of each technology is paid once and for all, regardless of how often
it is used.
Her optimal bundle Λ∗i solves
Λ∗i = argmaxΛi⊂L
fi(Λi).
In other words, a consumer chooses such a bundle of technologies that no additional
technology can bring enough added-utility in some situation to justify the cost of owning
it. For reference, we summarize the key notation in Table 1.
Table 1: Key notation
Symbol Interpretation
piis Probability for a consumer i to be in state s, only source of heterogeneity in the main model
vln Score of technology l on attribute n, aggregated in vector vl
us(vl) Utility from technology l in state s, increasing in each element of vl ,
strictly increasing in at least one element vln
p Normalized price of owning a technology, strictly higher than zero
4 Example
Following Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2014), consider a simple, special case where utility
us(vl) of a technology l is multi-linear in the scores vln’s of the product attributes n’s, at
each state s. This assumption is for simplicity only. We go back to more general utility
functions for technologies when deriving the results in the next section. To rule out the
trivial case where all consumers buy all technologies, we consider the case in which the
cost of an additional technology p is strictly positive.
In addition, suppose in this special case that there are two states of the world (s= 1,2)
and two product attributes (n = 1,2). Therefore, the vector of attributes of technology l is
vl = (vl1,vl2). The utility functions us’s of a technology l in state 1 and state 2 – identical
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for all consumers in this example – are respectively
u1(vl) = αvl1+(1−α)vl2, u2(vl) = αvl2+(1−α)vl1.
The value of parameter α specifies how the attributes weigh differently in the two
states. For example, if α = 12 , then both attributes are equally valued in each of the states,
and the two states are equivalent. On the contrary, if α = 1, then only one attribute matters
in each state. These are two extreme cases. Here we consider the intermediate case where
the two attributes are both valued, but with different weights, in each of the states. Without
loss of generality, assume 12 < α < 1, i.e. attribute s matters more in state s, for s = 1,2.
In other words, in state 1, the most important attribute of the product is attribute 1, while
in state 2 it is attribute 2. In the context of musical industry, for example, state 1 can
correspond to a state of the world where consumers care more about the practical aspects
of the technologies, while in state 2 they care more about the object itself.
Let the product attributes n = 1,2 be respectively “usability” and “object” with scores
displayed in Table 2 for three generations of technologies.
Table 2: Example of scores of technology attributes vln
Technology/Attribute usability (n = 1) object (n = 2)
Vinyl (l = 1) 1 3
CD (l = 2) 2 2
Digital (l=3) 3 1
Let EUi(vl) denote the expected utility of technology l for consumer i if she consumes
it in all the states,
EUi(vl) = pii1u1(vl)+pii2u2(vl).
Comparing the three generations of technologies, we can show that, for each consumer
who is more likely to be in state 1 one has:
EUi(v3)> EUi(v2)> EUi(v1).
It is also clear from Table 2 that no technology is better than another in both states of
the world.
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First, consider the case in which only the first two technologies are available:
L = {1,2}. Since EU(v2) > EU(v1), if a unique technology is chosen, it is the second
one (CD). It is possible to show (see (5) in the proof of Proposition 1) that a consumer
i buys the first generation (vinyl) as a complement, when the second generation (CD) is
available, if and only if the probability of being in state 1 pii1 is smaller than a threshold
p˜ii1. The expected value of the additional benefit of owning a vinyl when the state of
the world is 2 (when the object matters more) must be higher than the additional cost of
owning a second technology p, and this happens only if the frequency of state 2 is high.
Hence, if pii2 is big enough, the optimal bundle that maximizes (11) is Λ∗ = {1,2}, and
otherwise the optimal bundle is Λ∗ = {2}.
Second, consider the case in which only the last two technologies are available:
L = {2,3}. In Table 2, the difference between the scores of digital and CD is the same as
that between the scores of CD and vinyl for each attribute. Due to the multi-linearity of
us’s, the condition to buy both CD and digital music when only those two are available is
also that pii1 must be smaller than p˜ii1. Hence, a consumer that completely substitutes CD
to vinyl also completely substitutes digital music to CD.
Finally, if the three technologies are available: L = {1,2,3}, the condition for the
coexistence of vinyl and digital is fulfilled if and only if (cf. (8) in the proof of Proposition
1 in Appendix) pii1 is smaller than a threshold pˆii1, which is higher than p˜ii1. The reason
is that the difference between the scores of vinyl and digital on the “object” attribute is
twice as large as the difference between those scores of vinyl and CD or between those
scores of CD and digital on this attribute. Hence, a consumer that would completely stop
buying vinyl when CD appears may still choose to combine vinyl and digital music.
We show in Figure 2 the possible patterns of substitution for a consumer i with pii1 > 12 ,
when the technologies of three generations successively appear and each of them is better
than the previous one in the sense that it provides higher expected utility EUi(vl), at a
common cost p = 15 . The first area on the top left part of the graph corresponds to cases
pii1 > pˆii1 in which the probability of being in the most frequent state of the world is
high (high pii1) and/or in which the importance attached to each product attribute is quite
similar in different states of the world (low α). In this case, the process of innovation is
transitive, and each technology replaces the previous one. Such consumers never need
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Figure 2: the process of technological substitution, with p = 15 .
more than one technology. The second area pii1 ∈ (p˜ii1, pˆii1) in light grey, situated between
the two curves, corresponds to the case of technological comebacks. While the technology
of the second generation completely replaces the first one, there is room for a comeback
of this technology when the third generation appears. Finally, the third area pii1 < p˜ii1,
in dark grey at the bottom right of the graph, corresponds to the case in which the two
attributes are highly complementary. In this case, the two states of the world are almost
equally likely to happen (low pii1) and/or the product attribute that matters mostly in each
state of the world is fairly distinct (high α). In this area, the first-generation technology
never disappears. It becomes a complement to the second one, so that Λ∗ = {1,2} when
L = {1,2}, and remains a complement to the third one when L = {1,2,3}, while the
second-generation technology disappears: Λ∗ = {1,3}.
Take some specific parameters as an example here. Let α = 1320 and assume that prob-
ability pii1 for a consumer i to be in state 1 is identically distributed over [12 ,1] among
the population of consumers. Figure 2 shows how the optimal consumption bundle varies
with consumer preferences and the available technology set. On the horizontal axis is
the type of a consumer, fully characterized by her frequency to be in state 1, pii1. On the
vertical axis are the available technology sets.
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Figure 3: Consumers’ optimal consumption bundles for different sets of available technologies, with
α = 1320 , p =
1
5 .
In our example, no consumer keeps using vinyl all the time as long as a new generation
technology ever appears (p˜ii1 < 12 ). Nevertheless, vinyl makes a comeback for part of the
population. With the given distribution of piis’s, our model predicts that, when all the
three generations appear successively, one can expect a third of the consumers to choose
consuming both vinyl and digital, while the rest will use digital only, with pˆii1 = 23 . The
former corresponds to those who are more likely to be in state 2 where attribute “object”
is valued more than attribute “usability”. When only vinyl is available, there is no choice
and everyone uses vinyl. When CD appears, it completely substitutes vinyl. However,
with the arrival of digital music, all the consumers who care sufficiently about attribute
“object” (i.e. pii1 is sufficiently low) buy both vinyl and digital. In particular, it is only in
the presence of digital music that a comeback of the vinyl is possible.
5 General results
5.1 Preliminary observations
In this subsection, we return to the general setup presented in Section 3 to present the
different ways a technology can substitute another.
As in the example in Section 4, the most obvious comparison to be made between tech-
nologies is via their respective expected utilities EUi(vl). Trivially, according to equation
(1), if a unique technology is bought, it is the one that offers the highest expected utility.
We say that technology 2 dominates in expected utility technology 1 for consumer i if
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the former brings her a higher expected utility than the latter, i.e. EUi(v2)=∑s∈Spiis us(v2)≥
EUi(v1) = ∑s∈Spiis us(v1).
Lemma 1. The relationship of dominance in expected utility is transitive, i.e. if EUi(v2)>
EUi(v1) and EUi(v3)> EUi(v2), then EUi(v3)> EUi(v1).
The proof is trivial and is hence omitted. This is a standard result from utility theory,
since EU(v j) is a scalar. It implies that, in our specification, a technological comeback
cannot be explained by non-transitive preferences in which consumers would buy tech-
nology 2 only when 1 and 2 are available but technology 1 only when 1, 2 and 3 are
available. Hence, for a comeback to be possible, it has to rely on buying, at least at some
point, more than one technology.
To guarantee that a technology becomes permanently obsolete, regardless of the other
available technologies, a concept stronger than dominance in expected utility, called First-
Order Stochastic Dominance (FOSD), is needed. We say that technology 2 first-order
stochastically dominates technology 1 (2 FOSDs 1) if, for all state s ∈ S, us(v2)≥ us(v1)
and, for at least one state s ∈ S, us(v2)> us(v1).
Lemma 2. If technology 2 FOSDs technology 1, then technology 1 is never used when
technology 2 is available.
Indeed, it is enough to see that, according to (1), if technology 2 FOSDs technology 1,
then there is no state of the world in which technology 1 has any strictly positive added-
utility over technology 2. Hence, regardless of the presence of additional technologies,
if any of the two is chosen, it must be 2. Like dominance in expected utility, FOSD is a
transitive relationship.
We represent this relationship in the special case where there are three technologies
and two states of the world in Figure 4. The vertical axis represents the value of each
technology in a given state of the world. The two segments on the horizontal axis repre-
sent the two states of the world, with the length of each segment being the probability for
i to be in the corresponding state. Note that the area below the curve represents for each
technology its expected utility for i. In both examples, EUi(3)> EUi(2)> EUi(1). How-
ever, in the example presented by the left-hand-side graph in Figure 4, 3 FOSDs 2 FOSDs
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Figure 4: First order stochastic dominance.
1. On the contrary, in the example presented by the right-hand-side graph, technology 2
is better than technology 3 in some state of the world (state 2).
Definition 1. For consumer i, technology l completely substitutes technology k, denoted
by l i k, if the following is true: If k and l are the only two technologies available, then
k is not in i’s optimal bundle.
It is clear by Lemma 2 that if technology l FOSDs technology k, then l completely
substitutes k. But l can completely substitues k without FOSDing it, as the following
lemma suggests.
Lemma 3. If there are only two technologies, 1 and 2, available, then technology 2 com-
pletely substitutes technology 1 for consumer i if EUi(v2)> EUi(v1) and
∑
s∈S
piis max
l=1,2
us(vl)−∑
s∈S
piis us(v2)< p. (2)
This follows again directly from the maximization problem (1). Assume that EUi(v2)>
EUi(v1). We already know that if consumer i buys one technology only, it is technology
2 because of its higher expected utility for her. The utility added by owning an additional
technology 1 is strictly positive in the states where this older technology is more desirable
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than the newer one. This additional benefit corresponds to the left hand side of equation
(2).
In the example presented on the right hand side of Figure 4, suppose that only tech-
nologies 2 and 3 are available, then they can coexist in the optimal bundle of the consumer
(i.e. 3i 2) if and only if the grey area is larger than the cost of having an additional tech-
nology, i.e. A1≥ p.
5.2 Technological comebacks
In this subsection, we study more precisely the condition of existence of a technological
comeback. We define a comeback as follows.
Definition 2. Consider three technologies of subsequent generations such that EUi(v3)>
EUi(v2)> EUi(v1). Technology 1 makes a comeback for consumer i if:
(i) technology 2 completely substitutes technology 1, i.e. 2 i 1, so that Λ∗ = {2}
when L = {1,2},
(ii) technology 1 is part of the optimal consumption bundle of consumer i when the
third-generation technology becomes available, i.e. 1 ∈ Λ∗ when L = {1,2,3}.
This definition implies that for a second-generation technology to make the first one
temporarily disappear until the third generation makes a comeback to be possible, the
process of technological substitution (i) must not be transitive.
Proposition 1. The substitution relationship i defined in Definition 1 is not transitive,
i.e. it is possible that 3i 2, 2i 1, but 3i 1.
The formal proof is in Appendix. Here let us just point out that a consumer, while
maximizing her expected utility (cf. (1)), does not count the utility of a certain technology
l in a certain state of the world s unless l is the best choice in s. If a unique technology is
available to consumer i all the states, then its performance in each state matters. Whenever
there are more than one technology, what matters to the consumer is the utility added by
having an additional technology in each state.
The graph on the left hand side of Figure 5 illustrates an example with 2i 1, 3i 2
but 3i 1. Each new technology is better than the previous one for consumer i in expected
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Figure 5: The substitution process is not transitive
utility: EUi(v3) > EUi(v2) > EUi(v1). However, in the least frequent state of the world,
state 2, each new technology yields a lower utility than the previous one. In this example,
the area A1 is the loss due to the absence of technology 1 as a complement to technology 2.
The area A2 is the loss due to the absence of technology 2 as a complement to technology
3. Hence, if A1 < p and A2 < p, then 3i 2 and 2i 1, i.e. each technology completely
substitutes the previous one. However, if A1+A2 > p, technology 1 becomes a good
complement to technology 3, and consumer i prefers buying both technologies 1 and 3
to having 3 only. To sum up, if only technologies 1 and 2 are available, technology 1 is
obsolete. But the entry of technology 3 makes technology 2 obsolete in turn, which leaves
room for technology 1 to come back.
For this result, it does not matter how better the second-generation technology per-
forms than the first-generation one in the most likely state of the world. What is important
is how it performs in the least likely one. If the second generation performs worse than
the first one while the third generation performs worse than the second one in this state of
the world, there is room for a possible comeback.
Proposition 2. If technology 1 makes a comeback in the sense of Definition 2, then the
optimal bundle when all three technologies are available is Λ∗ = {1,3} and technology 2
disappears. In particular, it is possible that technology 3 does not completely substitutes
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technology 2 (denoted by 3 i 2), Λ∗ = {2,3} when L = {2,3}, but the comeback of
technology 1 makes technology 2 disappear: Λ∗ = {1,3} when L = {1,2,3}.
The formal proof is in Appendix. The first result of the proposition comes from the
fact that, if technology 1 does not add enough value to technology 2 compared with its cost
p, it certainly adds even less value to the combination of technologies 2 and 3. Hence, the
only possibility for a comeback of technology 1 is that the second-generation technology
becomes obsolete.
The graph on the right hand side of Figure 5 illustrate the second result of Proposition
2. Suppose that A1′ < p < A2′ and A1′+A2′ > p. The difference with the example on its
left is that the second-generation technology is almost as good as the first-generation one
in state 2. Hence, 3 i 2, in contrast to the example illustrated on its left where 3 i 2.
As a result, if technologies 2 and 3 were the only available ones here, consumer i would
buy both. Therefore, it is the presence of technology 1 that makes technology 2 irrelevant
to the consumer. In both examples in Figure 5, if 1 and 2 are the only available technolo-
gies, the second-generation technology completely substitutes the first-generation one (i.e.
condition 2 i 1 is fulfilled). In both examples, the optimal bundle when all three tech-
nologies are available is the same — technology 2 disappears and technology 1 comes
back.
In this example, the only thing that matters is whether technology 1 is better than
technology 2 in state 2 (u2(v1) > u2(v2)), and whether the difference between the utility
of technologies 1 and 3 in state 2 is sufficiently high to justify buying both (pii2(u2(v1)−
u2(v3)) = A1′+A2′ ≥ p). Since the second-generation technology is worse than the first
in the less likely state of the world, the two technologies in the optimal bundle are Λ∗ =
{1,3}when all the three generations are available. The relationship 3i 2 does not matter
to the optimal bundle in the presence of three technologies.
6 Product design
In the general model, we focus on the case in which consumer heterogeneity is charac-
terized by their different frequencies of being in each state of the world, and we do not
discuss the role of heterogeneity in the valuation of each dimension. However, the latter is
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important in the analysis of how being in a comeback situation should influence product
design. Should the rejuvenated technology be designed or advertised as mainstream or
as niche, in the sense of Johnson and Myatt (2006)? To see this, consider the following
variant of our model with two states of the world (S = {1,2}). Assume that technology 1
on its “advantageous” state of the world, state 2, is valued ui2(v1) = x+ εi by consumer
i, where ε is a zero-mean random variable specifying the taste of each consumer. All the
other contingent utilities of technologies (us(vl) for s 6= 2 or l 6= 1) are still common to all
consumers. A product has a niche design if the dispersion (the variance of ε , for a given
distribution) of consumer tastes is high. In other words, the product is designed and adver-
tised in order to please a limited number of consumers only, with high intensity. Similarly,
the product has a mainstream design if the dispersion is low. As a example, assume that ε
is uniformly distributed over the interval [−δ ,δ ], where δ ∈ [B,N] is the chosen design.
Here B stands for the broadest possible mainstream design (small variance), and N for the
most specialized “niche” design (high variance). A more general definition of demand
rotation follows a similar intuition and would merely be a rewriting of Johnson and Myatt
(2006) assuming exogenous prices.
Reformulating the main condition for a comeback (cf. equation (8) in Appendix)
implies that consumer i buys technology 1 in complement to technology 3 if and only if
x+ εi−u2(v3) = ui2(v1)−u2(v3)> p1−pii1 =
p
pii2
. (3)
Following Proposition 1 in Johnson and Myatt (2006), one can show that a marketer
always chooses an extreme product design among a collection of (mean-fixed) spreads of
random variable ε , i.e. either its minimum or maximum possible variance. If x−u2(v3)≥
p
pii2 , the probability of selling technology 1 to consumer i is maximized if the variance of
ε is low. This probability becomes 1 if u2(v1) is deterministic, i.e. δ = 0 hence ε ≡ 0.
If x− u2(v3) < ppii2 , the probability of making a sale is maximized if δ is high, with the
probability being 0 if δ = 0 hence ε ≡ 0.
Denote by ε˜i = ppii2 −x+u2(v3), the level of εi above which consumer i, who is in state
2 with probability pii2, is willing to buy technology 1. With a design δ , the probability of
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making a sale to consumer i is
q(pii2,δ ) =

1 if ε˜i ≤−δ ,
δ−ε˜
2δ if ε˜i ∈ (−δ ,δ )
0 if ε˜i ≥ δ
For all pii2 < px−u2(v3) = p˜i2, the optimal design is N; otherwise it is B. Assume again
pii1 is uniformly distributed on [12 ,1] so that pii2 is uniformly distributed on [0,
1
2 ]. If sellers
are able to offer the “right” design to each consumer, the probability of making a sale of
technology 1 is:
Q =
∫ p˜i2
0
q(pii2,N)dpii2+
∫ 1
2
p˜i2
q(pii2,B)dpii2.
Return to the example depicted in Figure 2. In the case where α = 1320 , there is a
demand for “broad” design of vinyl for all consumers with pii1 ∈ (12 , 23). Those consumers
like enough the “object” dimension to be willing to buy a simple vinyl, designed to please
everyone without taking risks. It is also possible to create additional demand by offering
a niche design that may reach a part of those buyers with pii1 > 23 . Those consumers are
not spontaneously willing to buy vinyl if it is designed as mainstream, but some might
be attracted by a more “risky” version. Moreover, in the case where α < .6 (the area on
the top left of Figure 3), no consumer would ever buy a broad design. However, some
comeback is still possible using a niche one.
Hence, equation (3) provides a simple guidance on how to choose the design. If the
consumers’ likelihood of being in the ‘technology-1-advantageous’ state of the world is
low and/or if the advantage that technology 1 has over technology 3 is low in this state,
the only chance to make a comeback is to try to offer a very niche design, that will please
a limited number of consumers only. Else, it is possible to design a mainstream comeback
aimed at most consumers.
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7 Discussion and conclusions
7.1 What are the important attributes for a comeback?
Above all, the model shows that the determinant of a comeback of a technology is not its
overall performance, but its specific performance in the state of the world where it adds
value to the newest technology. In the case of vinyl, Bartmanski and Woodward (2015)
explain that the way a vinyl complements digital is by offering a tangible object. For this
reason, in order to complement digital music (often sold as a bundle with a download
code for the digital version of the music), the vinyl must be designed in a way that em-
phasizes this dimension in particular. According to Bartmanski and Woodward (2015),
p.7, recent new and re-releases of vinyl incorporate special features which play up the
attractions of buying vinyl, relative to CDs and digital downloads. Heavy vinyl pressing
aims at suggesting the importance of the musical content, and increasing the longevity
and collectability of one’s purchase. The same holds for coloured vinyl or other special
features such as cover art posters.
The success of vinyl provides a fairly clear guide on which attributes a marketer or
product designer would need to develop and emphasize, with the aim of organizing a
comeback or the rejuvenation of a brand.
In the photography industry, the first generation of analogue films has been almost
entirely replaced by the second generation of digital cameras. The third generation is
based on phones and social networks, and is not originally designed for physical printing.
As more and more consumers use the third generation and abandon digital cameras –
according to data by the Camera and Imaging Product Association (cipa.jp), shipments of
digital cameras have decreased by more than 80% between 2010 and 2016 — the physical
dimension of analogue photography seems to have become a useful complement. Film
photography has started its return as a niche product, with sales growing at a 5% rate
annually, and Kodak is reintroducing discontinued products such as Ektachrome.7 A very
similar story can be told about the revival of Super 8 films.8 Some consumers who had
abandoned products of the first generation start using them again as a complement to the
7Olivier Laurent, “This is why film photography is making a comeback,” Time, January 26, 2017.
8James Temperton, “Kodak’s super 8 revival is leading a new wave of retro nostalgia,” Wired, June 17,
2017.
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third one.
As for vinyl, understanding and emphasizing the dimension that matters enough for
some consumers is the key for a comeback to be possible. Now that the photographic
experience is mostly dematerialized and has in large parts been transferred from digital
cameras to smartphones, the possibility to immediately print a physical picture could be
an ideal complement to social media. It seems to be the very route taken by Polaroïd,
a company that had almost completely disappeared from the market.9 Polaroïd is now
producing digital cameras combined with a printing device.10 A slightly different business
model is behind Fujifilm’s Instax analog cameras, of which more than 5 millions have
been sold in 2016,11 about 4 times more than Fujifilm’s sales of digital devices.12 The
idea is similar in the two cases: to combine and emphasize an (almost) disappeared feature
of the analogue world with the most recent technology. As shown in our model, what
determines the success of such products is whether there are states of the world in which
consumers sufficiently value the features that complement the newest technology.
In the mobile phone industry, there are no strictly speaking three generations replacing
each other. However, the subsequent successful innovations in the market have in common
to improve the product on most dimensions, except for the solidity and the battery life.
Hence, if for some consumers these dimensions matter sufficiently, there is room for a
niche return of phones resembling disappeared ones. HMD – the company that took
over Nokia phones from Microsoft – announced the return of the “3310” model in 2017,
based on a similar idea. The company claims that there is a demand for some of the
attributes of the original 3310 (low price, long battery life, simplicity) that could make
it an ideal complement to smartphones.13 The attribute of Nokia’s 3310 that may carry
over through time is often described as being “perhaps the most resilient and long-lasting
9Andrea Nagy Smith, “What was Polaroid thinking?,” Yale Insights, November 9, 2009.
10Johanna Stern, “Smile! The Polaroid-Style Instant Camera Is Back,” The Wall Street Journal, May 18,
2016 and Emmanuel Tsekleves, “The enduring appeal of analogue in a digital world,” The Conversation,
January 12, 2015.
11“Fujifilm zooms In on Instax’s Retro Appeal in a Digital Age, “The Wall Street Journal,” April 1st,
2016.
12“Fujifilm’s Instax Analog Camera is outselling its digital devices by nearly 4 times,” Digital Trends,
April 4m 2016.
13See for instance James Temperton, “Nokia 3310 and Snake are back...but there’s a catch,” Wire, Febru-
ary 28, 2017.
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phone ever made.”14 Hence, if the company intends to make some attributes of the product
prominent (in the sense of Chakraborty and Harbaugh, 2014), it should be the ones that
really differentiate the product from a smartphone and emphasize its complementarity.
The company seems to have captured the idea and has been focusing a large part of their
communication on the long life of the battery.15
7.2 How do we know if a technology is ready for a comeback?
First of all, if a technology has been replaced by another one which is better in every
possible dimension, no comeback is possible. This corresponds to the FOSD result of
Lemma 2. Second, it should be possible to replace the technology that has “predated”
potential coming-back one by a combination of an even newer one and the coming-back
one. However, as pointed out by Proposition 2, the second-generation technology does
not need to have disappeared to make the comeback possible. For instance, in the ab-
sence of vinyl, some consumers attracted by the “object” attribute can well be ready to
buy CD instead. Thus, the marketers should not wait for the complete disappearance of
the second generation. Instead, they need to evaluate whether it is possible to make the
second generation disappear by combining the coming-back technology with the newest
one. This is also one of the lessons from the success of current releases of new vinyl:
They are marketed in combination with digital technology so that consumers understand
immediately the complementarity.
The market for toys is experimenting similar attempts of bundling by the industry. A
three-generation representation of this market would be that the sales of a first generation
of traditional physical toys – such as Lego building blocks – have been declining with the
apparition of a second generation of more sophisticated toys and electronic games.16 Now
that a third generation of dematerialized entertainment is largely available for children,
it becomes possible to organize partial comebacks of a rejuvenated version of the first
14Andrew Griffin, “Nokia 3310, ‘the most reliable phone ever made’, to be re-launched at MWC 2017,”
The Independent, Tuesday 14 February 2017
15“Nokia 3310 relaunched with even longer battery life of 22 hours – 10 times the original,” Irish Times,
February 28, 2017.
16See for instance Nick Watt and Hana Karar, “The land where Lego comes to life,” Abc News, November
16, 2009 and Knowledge@Wharton , , Craig McLean, “Lego, play it again,” The Telegraph, December 17,
2009, “Innovation Almost Bankrupted Lego - Until It Rebuilt with a Better Blueprint,” Time, July 23, 2012.
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generation using complementarities, “from cartoon to video games to films to physical
toys”.17 In particular, Lego blocks thrive as a complement to social media, with fan videos
shared on Youtube (and its application for children) often being described as one of the
reasons sales of construction toys have surged.18 Such a complementarity is a deliberate
choice of the companies, not a sudden wave of nostalgia for older products. While the
contemporary building blocks are not so technologically different from what they were 20
years ago, the storytelling that accompanies them is making a large use of the most recent
technologies.
7.3 Conclusion
This research contributes to the literature on innovation and product substitution, as well
as the one on product positioning and design. Our model is based on utility-maximizing
consumers in a static context. We provide a simple and testable condition on consumer
choice for a technological comeback to be possible with time-independent preferences. A
first limitation of our approach is that we do not disentangle our “fundamental” notion of
comeback (complementarity) from possible changes in preferences. Nevertheless, in our
model if complementarities exist, nostalgia (and the changes in preferences representing
it) could only increase the demand for a comeback.
A first immediate extension to the model would be to dig further into the consumer
choice in a multi-attributes context. A second one would be to explicitly develop the
dynamic of comebacks in models of technological substitutions. A third one could be
to develop further the strategic role of the marketer, beyond the simple model of product
design we develop in Section 6.
17Child’s play, “The Economist”, September 9th 2013
18Gregory Schmidt, “Lego’s success leads to competitors and spinoffs, “The New York Times,” Novem-
ber 20, 2015.
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Appendix
Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider a case with 2 states of the world (S = {1,2}) and start
with the first and the second generations available only (L= {1,2}). Assume (1) EUi(v2)>
EUi(v1) for consumer i, (2) state 1 happens more often for consumer i (pii1 > 12 ), and
(3) the second-generation product is strictly better in state 1 (u1(v2) > u1(v1)). Con-
sumer i uses technology 2 exclusively if (i) {2} is averagely better than {1}, which is
true because EUi(v2) > EUi(v1); and (ii) {2} is better than {1,2}, which means that
pii1u1(v2)+pii2u2(v2)− p > pii1u1(v2)+pii2 maxl u2(vl)−2p (recall that u1(v2)> u1(v1))
or, equivalently, pii2u2(v2)+ p > pii2 maxl u2(vl). This condition is satisfied if
either u2(v2)≥ u2(v1); (4)
or u2(v2)< u2(v1), pii1 > 1− pu2(v1)−u2(v2) . (5)
In the example in Section 4, (5) simplifies to pii1 > 1− p2α−1 = p˜ii1. These conditions
represent 2i 1 and specify the idea that either the second-generation technology is better
in both dimensions, i.e. 2 FOSDs 1 (condition (4)), or it is inferior in state 2, but the loss
of using it in this state is compensated by p, the spared cost of having technology 1 in
addition to technology 2 (condition (5)).
Similarly, if only second and third generations are available (L= {2,3}), since EUi(v3)>
EUi(v2) and u1(v3)> u1(v2), consumer i uses technology 3 (3i 2) exclusively if
either u2(v3)≥ u2(v2); (6)
or u2(v3)< u2(v2), pii1 > 1− pu2(v2)−u2(v3) . (7)
Now suppose that conditions (5) and (7) are fulfilled for consumer i. Explicitly,
u1(v3)> u1(v2)> u1(v1), u2(v3)< u2(v2)< u2(v1) and pii1 > 1− pmax{u2(v1)−u2(v2),u2(v2)−u2(v3)} .
Hence a technology of a generation g always completely substitutes the one of the previ-
ous generation g−1, but is strictly inferior to g−1 in the less likely state, state 2.
Consumer i can still choose the first-generation technology when the second and the
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third generations are available, i.e. {1,3} is the optimal bundle in {1,2,3}. It is easy to
see that {1,3} is better than {1,2}, {2,3} and {1,2,3}. By (5) and (7) we rule out that
{1} and {2} are the optimal bundle, because {1} is strictly dominated by {2}, and {2} by
{3}.
It is thus enough to show that {1,3} is preferred to {3} so as to have 3i 1,
pii1 < 1− pu2(v1)−u2(v3) . (8)
In the example in Section 4, (8) simplifies to pii1 < 1− p2(2α−1) = pˆii1. Denote u1(v3)−
u1(v2) = a, u1(v2)− u1(v1) = b, u2(v1)− u2(v2) = c, and u2(v2)− u2(v3) = d. Then
a,b,c,d > 0 and the conditions that pii1 should satisfy are summarized here (recalling that
EUi(v3)> EUi(v2)> EUi(v1) and pii1 > 12 ):
max
{
1
2
,1− p
max{c,d} ,
d
a+d
,
c
b+ c
,
}
< pii1 < 1− pc+d , (9)
This is possible only if
p < min
{
1
2
,
b
b+ c
,
a
a+d
}
· (c+d). (10)
The fact that 2 i 1, 3 i 2 and 3 i 1 implies the non transitivity of the substitution
relationship. Given our assumptions, substitutions are not transitive for consumer i for
some value of pii1 ∈ (12 ,1) if and only if the technology cost p satisfies (10).
Finally, note that a comeback of technology 1 happens however for each consumer i
for which pii1 > 12 and conditions (5) (the first technology disappears) and (8) (the come-
back) are met, regardless of whether 3i 2 is fulfilled.
Proof of Proposition 2. We are considering a comeback situation in the sense of Defini-
tion 2. Hence we have to show that (i) technology 1 is part of the optimal bundle in
{1,2,3} and (ii) technology 1 is not part of the optimal bundle in {1,2}. First, we know
that {1} is not the optimal bundle, because EUi(v2) > EUi(v1) is a necessary condition
for (ii) (or by Definition 2). Secondly, {1,2} cannot be the optimal bundle, because 2
completely substitutes 1 by Definition 2. We are left with two possible optimal bundles,
{1,3} and {1,2,3}. Let us show by contradiction that {1,2,3} cannot be the optimal
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bundle.
Assume that Λ∗ = {1,2,3} when L= {1,2,3}. Recall that Λ∗ = {2} when L= {1,2}.
Therefore, by definition of an optimal bundle,
∑
s∈S
piis max
l=1,2,3
us(vl)−∑
s∈S
piis max
l=2,3
us(vl)> p,
∑
s∈S
piis max
l=1,2
us(vl)−∑
s∈S
piis us(v2)< p.
Equivalently, ∑s∈Spiis[us(v1)−us(v2)]+ < p < ∑s∈Spiis[us(v1)−maxl=2,3 us(vl)]+, where
[x]+ = max{x,0}. This implies that
∑
s∈S
piis
{[
us(v1)−us(v2)
]+− [us(v1)−max
l=2,3
us(vl)
]+}
< 0 (11)
However, for all s ∈ S, us(v2) ≤ maxl=2,3 us(vl) which implies that us(v1)−us(v2) ≥
us(v1)−maxl=2,3 us(vl) and, consequently,
[
us(v1)−us(v2)
]+≥ [us(v1)−maxl=2,3 us(vl)]+.
Therefore (11) is impossible. Indeed, (11) means that the value of technology 1 to a bun-
dle containing both technologies 2 and 3 is higher than to a bundle containing technology
2 only.
Next let us give an example where {1,3} is the optimal bundle in {1,2,3} and {2,3}
is the optimal bundle in {2,3}.
Assume that S = 1,2, u1(v3)> u1(v2)> u1(v1), u2(v1)> u2(v2)> u2(v3), EU(v3)>
EU(v2) > EU(v1), and technology 2 completely substitutes 1, i.e. {2} is the optimal
bundle in {1,2}. Denote u1(v3)− u1(v2) = a, u1(v2)− u1(v1) = b, u2(v1)− u2(v2) = c,
and u2(v2)−u2(v3) = d.
First, for {1,3} to be the optimal bundle in {1,2,3}, one must have (i) {1,3} is
better than {3}: ∑s∈Spiis maxl=1,3 us(vl)−∑s∈Spiisus(v3) > p which means that pii2 >
p
c+d , and (ii) {1,3} is better than {2,3} (1 being preferred to 2 as a complement to 3):
∑s∈Spiis maxl=1,3 us(vl)−∑s∈Spiis maxl=2,3 us(vl)> 0 which is satisfied by assumption.
Next, EUi(v3) > EUi(v2) > EUi(v1) requires that pii2 < aa+d and pii2 <
b
b+c . Finally,
technology 2 substituting technology 1 requires, in addition, ∑s∈Spiis maxl=1,2 us(vl)−
∑s∈Spiisus(v2)< p or, equivalently, pii2 <
p
c .
To summarize, one has only to have pc+d < pii2 < max{ pc , bb+c , aa+d}. Besides, for this
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to be possible, we impose that pc+d < min{ bb+c , aa+d} or, equivalently, (b− p)c+ (d−
p)b > 0 and (c− p)a+(a− p)d > 0, which is true when a,b,c,d are all greater than p,
for example.
Heterogeneous prices
Consider a variant of the main model, but assume that instead of a single price p, there ex-
ists a price pl ≥ 0 for each available technology l in the set L. Equation (1) that determines
the expected utility of a bundle Λi for a consumer i rewrites
fi(Λi) = ∑
s∈S
piis max
l∈Λi
us(vl)− ∑
l∈Λi
pl, (12)
with the optimal bundle still solving Λ∗i = argmaxΛi⊂L fi(Λi). As Propositions 1 and 2
are claims of existence, their proof holds when allowing for heterogeneous prices. The
only way in which different prices affect the model, is that what determines whether
a technology is preferred to another is the relative prices of technologies, while what
determines whether a technology adds enough value to a given bundle is its absolute
price. More precisely, Lemma 3 rewrites as:
Lemma 4. If there are only two technologies, 1 and 2, available, then technology 2 com-
pletely substitutes technology 1 for consumer i if EUi(v2)− p2 > EUi(v1)− p1 and
∑
s∈S
piis max
l=1,2
us(vl)−∑
s∈S
piis us(v2)< p1. (13)
Hence, for technology 2 to be preferred to technology 1, its “value-for-money” (the
value net of the price) must be higher. However, once we know that technology 2 is
part of the bundle, what matters to whether technology 1 is a good complement is how
much value it brings on top of technology 2 only, compared to the price p1. The price of
technology 2 is not relevant to this question.
For instance, in the example discussed in Section 4, the condition for each technol-
ogy to be better than the previous one for consumer i is EUi(v3)− p3 > EUi(v2)− p2 >
EUi(v1)− p1. However, consumer i stops buying technology 1 when technology 2 be-
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comes available if
pii1 > 1− p12α−1 = p˜ii1, (14)
ans she stops buying technology 2 when technology 3 becomes available if
pii1 > 1− p22α−1 . (15)
There is a comeback of technology 1 if both conditions (14) and (15) are satisfied and
pii1 < 1− p12(2α−1) = pˆii1 > p˜ii1. (16)
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